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As it was bluntly stated on the homepage of the Carnegie Council Program 
on Justice and Global Economy, “[g]lobalization has become a buzzword for 
the overarching economic, political, social, and cultural trends of the late 
twentieth century. Considered from the perspective of social and economic 
justice, however, globalization has had a mixed record of success, at best.”
1 
The mixed blessings of globalization came under attack on several occasions 
such as the latest international summits in Europe and the Americas, and three 
editions of the World Social Forum, held at Porto Alegre, Brazil, at the 
____________ 
* A first draft of this paper was read at the Philosophisches Forum of the Universität Kassel, in a 
seminar organized by Prof. Hans-Georg Flickinger in February 2003 and supported by the CAPES-
DAAD exchange program on “Social Movements and the Struggle for Citizenship Rights: A 
Comparison between Brazil and Germany.” 
1 Cf. http://www.carnegiecoumeil.org/themes/justice.html Civitas – Revista de Ciências Sociais v. 4, nº 1, jan.-jun. 2004 
 
40 
threshold of this new century. From a Third World standpoint, it is not only the 
opposition  of  labor  and  environmental  activists  that  has  made  a  strong 
impression on public opinion, but an ever-growing anti-Davos unease through 
the creation and fostering of alternative forums of public discussion that deal 
with the complex phenomenon of globalization from a rather local perspective, 
such as the civil society and its voluntary associations, unions, and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). Although both unionists and NGOs in 
Brazil  tend  to  radically  oppose  what  has  been  perceived  as  a  neoliberal 
imposition of globalization “from above” --global economy being reducible to 
the interests of the G-7 and so-called developed nations--, workers’ and union-
related organizations seek alternative economic ways to solve infrastructural 
problems while educational, environmental, and most NGOs seem to be more 
concerned about the moral transformations under way in our social, political 
and economic institutions.
2 Hence, what has been superficially identified with 
an anti-globalization movement in Brazil refers us back to the broader question 
of the normative grounds of democracy itself: “Why, after all, should we stand 
up for democracy?” The shift from a 21-year military dictatorship to a full 
constitutional democracy in Brazil was only inaugurated with the transfer of 
power to a civilian president in 1985 and radicalized with the impeachment of 
President-elect Collor in 1992, but democratization is still under way and has 
indeed  a  long  way  to  go,  given  the  social  inequalities,  corruption,  and 
authoritarianism that haunt this nation. To the extent that those pathologies 
have been tackled by globalization and the latter equated with the ongoing 
democratization  of  institutions  worldwide,  the  normative  dimension  of 
globalization (“global justice”) can be said to translate the very challenges 
faced by the Brazilian transition to democracy, particularly those taken up by 
the civil society, social movements, and NGOs (“local action”). The main 
problem of my research can be thus stated: “How can a political theory of 
global justice account for local action within a political culture which is still in 
the process of consolidating its constitutional-democratic institutions?” Starting 
from liberal models of social democracy inspired by Immanuel Kant’s political 
thought, such as the ones proposed by John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas, 
without any partisan commitments to the different programs of the leftist 
spectrum, I shall confine myself to what I term “the Brazilian reception of 
Rawls’s political liberalism,” --in particular, to his contribution to a theory of 
global justice (Pogge, 2000) and recent appropriations by Habermas and other 
Rawlsian-inspired recasting of social democracy. It is my contention here that 
the  main  challenge  of  global  justice  consists  in  making  the  normative 
dimension of globalization work for the actual consolidation of democracy and 
citizenship rights in the social, political, and economic institutions of so-called 
____________ 
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emergent societies, such as Brazil. Hence, the comprehensive, global program 
of  claiming  human  rights  locally,  particularly  in  Brazil  and  developing 
countries, reflects what in Rawlsian terms has been called an international 
“reflective equilibrium” in the very putting into practice of the agendas of the 
United Nations, the European Union, and hundreds of NGOs all over the 
planet. Three main problems arise at the outset, corresponding to the three 
main theses of my essay, namely: 1) Rawls’s political liberalism is more 
defensible as a specifically political, freestanding conception of global justice, 
as opposed to the cosmopolitan versions and comprehensive receptions of 
“justice as fairness”; 2) since his later writings do not shift away from his 
earlier theory of justice, but rather radicalize it and make it more defensible as 
a  noncomprehensive  doctrine,  the  historical,  sociocultural  background  of 
societies that did not experience the full process of a bourgeois revolution or 
liberal democracy do not have to follow any pregiven patterns of political 
development but may always resort to the Rawlsian paradigm of an “original 
position”  at  any  given  time,  just  as  constitutional,  administrative,  and 
institutional reforms bring into effect the appropriate changes to respond to the 
ongoing  claims  of  social  movements,  grassroots  activism,  human  rights 
militancy,  and  NGOs;  3)  finally,  the  problem  of  an  atomist-individualist 
conception of self, supposedly inherent in Rawls’s liberal theory of justice, is 
shown to give way to a more realistic view of human rights, allowing both for 
non-Western, non-Eurocentric contributions and for a veritable, interactive co-
constitution of citizenship and governance, on a local, national level and on a 
global, international scenario, assured by the normative correlation of person 
and society. The communitarian critique of liberalism can be thus shown to 
have decisively contributed to making the liberal conception of constitutional 
democracy  even  more  defensible,  as  attest  the  latest  writings  by  Rawls, 
Habermas, and Bobbio, especially on the problem of juridification. In this 
sense, I firmly believe that Rawls’s lasting contribution to political theory helps 
us overcome the dialogue de sourds between those who insist on a minimum 
state and those who inflate the social attributions of a centralized government. 
By resorting to a theory of global justice that avoids the pitfalls of both 
neoliberalism and state socialism, an attempt is made at recasting Rawls’s idea 
of public autonomy within a society whose democratic institutions are still in 
the making. I am drawing on Rawls’s trilogy to account for the defense of 
social democracy in Brazil and its insertion in the globalizing process without 
subscribing  to  a  neoliberal  agenda  or  succumbing  to  the  universalist-
communitarian dilemma. 
Brazilian political theorists seem to oscillate between two main alternative 
discourses on the democratization under way in post-military Latin America: a 
“dialectical” one which places the task of democratization in the reconstitution Civitas – Revista de Ciências Sociais v. 4, nº 1, jan.-jun. 2004 
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of types of mediation between the private sphere and the state (including 
popular  organizations  as  well  as  institutions  for  political  citizenship), 
suppressed or deformed by bureaucratic-military regimes, and an “analytical” 
one which regardless of all atomization, depoliticization, and manipulation of 
society by the authoritarian state and the former’s tactics of survival and 
resistance through solidary forms of association, stresses the social foundations 
of civil society. (Cohen and Arato, 1992, p. 48-58) While one model starts 
from  the  fact  of  transition  (from  a  military,  authoritarian  to  a  civilian, 
democratic regime), the other finds its starting point and thrust in the very 
equation of civil society and freedom. As Francisco Weffort put it, “we want a 
civil society, we need to defend ourselves from the monstrous state in front of 
us. This means that if [civil society] does not exist, we need to invent it. If it is 
small, we need to enlarge it... In a word, we want civil society because we want 
freedom.” ( Stepan, 1989, p. 349) Although Cohen and Arato succeed in 
problematizing these and other related approaches, especially by pointing to the 
danger of demobilization entailed in a reduction of civil society to the political 
sphere, their analysis of Latin American democratization seems to take for 
granted  the  conception  of  “transition,”  even  if  distinguished  from  and 
conjugated  with  “processes  of  initiation,  consolidation,  and  completion.” 
Leonardo Avritzer has shown that theories of transition fail to account for the 
Brazilian process of democratization insofar as they leave unexplained “1) the 
problem  of  political  continuity  that  manifests  itself  in  the  survival  of an 
authoritarian political culture; and 2) the problems that emerge from the theory 
of transition’s inability to incorporate an adequate theory of civil society.” 
(1995, p. 243) In other words, democratization must address both the question 
of a public, political culture and the question of a civil society likely to bring 
about structural transformations, including the transfer of power and the free 
coordination of action. As Avritzer puts it, “democratization has to involve in 
some form the political system’s submission to rules of publicity and control by 
civil society.” To be sure, this problematic underlies the very attempt by Cohen 
and Arato to recast a theory of civil society, which they define “as a sphere of 
social interaction between economy and state, composed above all of the 
intimate sphere (esp. the family), the sphere of associations (esp. voluntary 
associations), social movements, and forms of public communication.” (1992, 
p. ix) 
By resorting to Rawls’s political, liberal theory of justice, as well as to his 
correlated views of deliberative democracy and public autonomy, I would like 
to argue for an idea of public reason that subscribes both to an autonomous, 
discursive self-understanding of the Brazilian ethos for local action (say, an 
agenda created by and for the sake of Brazilian civil society, traditional and 
alternative social movements) and to a freestanding concept of justice which is N. de Oliveira – Globalization and democratization in Brazil:... 
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inseparable  from  its  universalizable,  co-constitutive  principles  of  liberty, 
equality, reciprocity and publicity. Given the Brazilian Kant Renaissance in 
ethics and political philosophy, following the Marxist and Hegelian-inspired 
liberationist movements of the 70’s and 80’s (of which liberation theologian 
Leonardo Boff, the late educator Paulo Freire, and the President-elect, Luiz 
Inácio  Lula  da  Silva,  were  among  the  most  important  exponents),  the 
conjugation  of  freedom  and  equality,  peace  and  justice,  toleration  and 
participation, autonomy and solidarity, have become more and more appealing 
for the construction of a Third Way that avoids the pitfalls of the Cold War 
binary logic of exclusion. Even as one differentiates between “liberation” in a 
broader social, philosophical use and in a strictly theological use --say, between 
Latin  American  “liberation  theology”  and  various  conceptions  of  social 
liberation--,  the  ideals  of  cosmopolitan  democracy  and  global  justice  do 
authorize a conception of liberation that refers not only to the social, historical 
phenomenon comprising both catholic and protestant grassroots movements in 
Latin American, but also to black movements, feminist movements, indigenous, 
Palestinian, Irish, African, and many other ethnic, human-rights and base 
movements from developed and Third World countries alike that claim to some 
form of social, political emancipation. In effect, what was named “liberation 
philosophy”  in  Latin  America  emerged  out  of  the  same  social,  political 
concerns and philosophical presuppositions that characterized the theological 
movement, which was ecumenical and global from its very beginnings in its 
radical intent to reform anew the Church, as attest the early writings of Rubem 
Alves,  Gustavo  Gutiérrez,  and  Leonardo  Boff.  From  a  philosophical-
theological standpoint, the term “liberation” cannot be separated from its 
correlated terms “liberty” and “freedom” --and it is in this very etymological, 
conceptual vicinity that we should recast the radical project of social justice vis 
à vis its political liberal roots. It is my contention here that the challenges posed 
by liberationist thought could not and still cannot be met by the reappropriation 
of Marxist analysis alone, insofar as its properly ethical, political thrust is 
compromised  by  a  totalitarian  conception  of  human  autonomy  and  self-
liberation. I propose instead that the reformulation of political liberalism and 
social democracy may help us carry out the project of social justice through the 
democratization of social, economic, and political institutions in emergent 
societies, in Latin America and elsewhere. (de Oliveira, 2002) While Christian 
approaches to philosophy seemed reluctant to take liberal democracy seriously 
in most Third World countries, political philosophy in Europe and North 
America failed to respond to the challenges of Neo-Marxist thought until the 
publication of Rawls’s A Theory of Justice in 1971, the same year major 
liberation  theologians  launched  their  manifestoes  against  the  neoliberal 
doctrine of development (desarollo) imposed “from above.” Just as the Roman 
Catholic Church played a decisive role during the Old and New Republic Civitas – Revista de Ciências Sociais v. 4, nº 1, jan.-jun. 2004 
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regimes  in  alliance  with  the  ruling  elites  (respectively  known  as  the 
institutionalization  of  oligarchy,  1889-1930,  and  populism,  1930-1964), 
significant segments of the Brazilian Church took sides with the poor and social 
movements that defied the authoritarianism of the military period (1964-1985) 
and consolidated the democratizing process after the 1988 Constitution. The 
rise of the third sector, its integration with social movements and NGOs’ 
response to the challenges of globalization have paved the way for a new 
conception of sustainable development and social responsibility, as the state 
reforms and the participatory engagement of civil society point today to an 
ever-growing awareness of active citizenship that goes beyond revolution and 
philanthropy  (Krischke,  2001;  Sobottka,  2002).  It  is  against  this  social 
historical background that I should like to place some reflections on the 
recasting of political liberalism.  
Kant’s  theory  of  justice  and  his  ideal  of  global  peace  have  been 
appropriated by Rawls in such a pervasive way that for many social and 
political thinkers it has become the sought-for key to strike a much desirable 
balance  between  the  radical  changes  advocated  by  the  left  (esp.  social 
movements such as the landless, sem-terra, who fight for a nationwide land 
reform) and the consolidation of individual rights claimed by the right (esp. 
judicial reviews, trade liberalization, and state reforms). Just as Marx and 
Hegel dominated the Brazilian academic political debate in the 70s and 80s, 
Hobbes and Kant have been rediscovered in the 90s, following the critique of 
the reception of liberalism in Brazil and the collapse of historical socialism in 
Eastern Europe. I firmly believe that this Brazilian reception of authors such as 
Rawls and Habermas has succeeded in at least pointing to the possibility of a 
philosophy of praxis that does not sacrifice the individual and the pluralism of 
reasonable ends. Hence both Habermas’s and Rawls’s procedural projects of 
democracy have been largely debated in Brazil, and a post-Kantian critique of 
modern subjectivity has also found a great reception among Brazilians in 
various analyses of social and political exclusion.
3 As Anthony Pereira put it so 
well, we must avoid reducing Brazil’s democratization to one of the two 
extremes: the resurrection of a unified civil society against a despotic state (an 
extreme  society-centered  argument)  and  a  controlled  liberalization  “from 
above” by agents within the state (state-centered account). (1997, p. 3) In this 
sense, Rawls and Habermas are representative of the main insights into the 
political-theoretical problematic that might be termed the “unfinished project of 
democratization in Brazil.” For both Habermas’s and Rawls’s procedural 
theories of justice and democracy have been largely debated in Brazil, with a 
____________ 
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view to calling into question the aporias of the so-called liberal-communitarian 
debate in ethics and political philosophy, by proposing local practices of 
individuation  through  a  socialization  that  cuts  across  ethnic,  gender, and 
cultural identities, far beyond liberal theories of minority rights. It remains to 
be seen how any critique of democratization and globalization may contribute 
to  the  autonomous  construction  of  civil  society  without  reducing  the 
differentiation between state and economy to a merely strategic, instrumental 
device. In Habermasian terms, strategic conceptions of power fail to grasp the 
communicative grounds of social action, just as Rawls’s political liberalism 
unmasks the shortcomings of both utilitarian and rational choice models to 
account for the Brazilian challenges of bringing out “ethics in politics.”  
As one re-examines Rawls’s and Habermas’s contributions to modern 
political theory, in particular, their recasting of the Kantian universalizable 
principle of autonomy and its political implications, one cannot fail to notice 
how public reason lies at the heart of democratizing processes and is decisive 
to the survival of constitutionally-grounded institutions in this new century. 
Both Rawls and Habermas have critically appropriated Kant’s cognitivist, 
universalist and emancipatory conception of moral autonomy so as to attempt 
at an original understanding of publicity and political culture. Kant can thus be 
said to stand as the arbiter between Rawls and Habermas –als Schiedsrichter 
zwischen Rawls und Habermas, to paraphrase an article by the young Marx-- 
just as Locke’s “liberal individualism” and Rousseau’s “popular sovereignty” 
had been previously judged and arbitrated by Kant’s political philosophy of 
justice.
4 Like Rawls, Habermas shows that normativity must go beyond a 
merely conventional level of morality and require the structural transformation 
of legal and economic-administrative institutions so as to make possible the 
very co-existence of democratic differentiated interests. Kant’s deontological 
ethics is thus opposed to both utilitarian and eudaimonistic views of morality 
and politics, as it serves to construct a nonmetaphysical, political conception of 
justice (Rawls’s “political autonomy”) and an intersubjective conception of 
autonomy (Habermas’s “discourse theory of morality and law”). Both Rawls 
and Habermas start from a critical standpoint regarding Kant’s fact of reason so 
as to account for the principle of autonomy in moral and political reasoning. 
(Beiner  and  Booth,  1993)  While  Rawls  seeks  to  recast  the  principle  of 
universalizability as a procedural test for maxims, Habermas reformulates 
Kantian proceduralism in intersubjective, communicative terms. Unlike Rawls, 
however,  Habermas  explicitly  embraces  Hegel’s  critique  of  Kant  in  his 
____________ 
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reconstruction of the latter’s proceduralism. Although I cannot recast the 
Rawls-Habermas debate here, it is my contention that the Brazilian reception of 
these authors can help us situating the pros and cons of both views as we seek 
to justify, in nonmetaphysical terms, the normative grounds of democratization 
in relation to the complex phenomenon of globalization. Hence both Rawls and 
Habermas seem to be caught in the same aporia of reformulating the Kantian 
conception of autonomy to account for the moral foundations of the political 
(and  hence  of  a  liberal  republicanism)  without  its  metaphysical 
presuppositions. (de Oliveira, 2000) For Kant, the essential character of law is 
universality and the person who acts from duty attends to the universality of her 
principle, i.e., one only acts on a maxim that she could will to be a universal 
law (categorical imperative). While Habermas seeks to maintain both the 
observer’s and the participant’s standpoints in a dual conception of society as 
system and lifeworld, Rawls recasts his theory of justice within the framework 
of an overlapping consensus whereby the reasonable pluralism of our liberal 
democracies  accommodate  competing,  comprehensive  doctrines  (moral, 
religious, ideological). ( Pogge, 1989) Rawls proposes thus a public criterion of 
justice for judging feasible institutional structures for a society in moral terms, 
by endorsing the principles of equal liberty, fair equality of opportunities and 
difference within a procedural device of representation (“original position”, 
behind the “veil of ignorance”). (Rawls, 1993, p. 5f.; 1971, §§ 11, 14, 39) 
The principles of justice can be fairly recast in a social-democratic model 
that favors an egalitarian approach to public policies and a liberal defense of 
human rights, pluralism, participatory citizenship, and social responsibility. 
(Rawls, 1996; 2001) Such is the point of intersection of communitarian and 
liberal  accounts  of  a  true  democratic  ethos.  The  recent  debate  opposing 
Rawls’s political liberalism and Habermas’s deliberative democracy, besides 
problematizing the taken-for-granted oppositions between universalism and 
communitarianism, social contract and natural rights, has served also to enrich 
our modern understanding of political culture. Rawls’s shift from the 1971 
account of justice as fairness towards the later reformulations leading to his 
1993 volume on political liberalism does indeed address this problem, inherent 
in a hypothetical, contractarian procedure. Rawls’s theory of justice can thus 
help us reconstruct modern civil society as the institutional component of a 
postconventional  democracy.  Rawls’s  earlier  conception  of  deliberative 
democracy and his later conception of a public political culture that promotes 
justice in reflective equilibrium attest to civil society’s democratizing thrust in 
a  pluralist  world.  Although  Rawls  and  Habermas  can  be  identified  as 
“procedural  universalists”  as  they  resort  to  a  normative,  universalizable 
conception of Kantian-inspired, public practical reason to justify the integration 
and  differentiation  of  institutions  such  as  the  family,  civil  society,  state, N. de Oliveira – Globalization and democratization in Brazil:... 
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governmental and nongovernmental organizations, they disagree not only in 
their procedural schemes (devices of representation) but also in their political 
intent. While Rawls seeks to rescue the democratic radicalness of Rousseau’s 
general  will  in  its  alliance  with  Lockean,  toleration-oriented  liberalism, 
Habermas sets out to overcome the fin-de-siècle crisis of democracy, especially 
the legitimation crisis that characterizes modern state, without falling back into 
the aporias of a critique of ideology or falling prey to relativism, skepticism, 
and historicism. Both thinkers have thrown a new light on the normative 
grounds of social criticism, by reformulating the conception of social life forms 
(political culture and lifeworld) and the conception of a free, moral person 
(sense of justice and conceptions of the good). Both Rawls and Habermas 
reappropriate Kant’s distinction between right/law and ethics, as they recast the 
conception of a public normativity regulated by rational discursivity, shared by 
all parties and guiding human, autonomous action in pluralist democracies. 
Political questions are thus procedurally discussed according to devices of 
representation (e.g., Rawls’s “original position” and Habermas’s “ideal speech 
situation”)  and  grounded  in  a  moral,  normative  and  universalizable 
argumentative construction. While Rawls’s political liberalism anchors in the 
conception of a public political culture the “overlapping consensus” which 
accounts  for  the  contractarian,  binding  coexistence  of  reasonable, 
comprehensive doctrines in social cooperation, Habermas seeks to articulate 
the  question  of  normativity  with  the  social,  political  question  of 
institutionalization,  in  the  very  conception  of  an  integrated  model 
differentiating the systemic world of institutions (defined by the ability to 
respond  to  functional  demands  of  the  social  milieu)  from  the  lifeworld 
(Lebenswelt, i.e. forms of cultural, societal and personal reproduction which 
are  integrated  through  norms  consensually  accepted  by  all  participants). 
Therefore, it is by the normativity inherent in a given public political culture 
and lifeworld that social life is actualized, calibrated and balanced at the very 
level of political institutions. Both Rawls and Habermas succeed in showing 
that normativity must supersede a merely conventional stage of morality and 
demand the structural transformation of legal and economic-administrative 
institutions so as to make possible the coexistence of differentiated, democratic 
interests. While the theory of communicative reason claims to provide us with 
the foundations of meaning, reference, and truth or validity for both theoretical 
and practical reason, Rawls’s theory of public reason is confined to the political 
conception of justice, particularly addressed to the basic structure of society, 
understood  as  a  liberal-democratic  unified  system  of  social  cooperation 
between moral, free persons. Hence “public reason” in Rawls cannot be simply 
equated  with  Habermas’s  “public  sphere.”  Although  both  attend  to  the 
intersubjective constitution of the social world, we must keep their differences 
in their conception of publicity–which Rawls formulates in terms of both a Civitas – Revista de Ciências Sociais v. 4, nº 1, jan.-jun. 2004 
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political  culture  and  a  background  culture.  Grosso  modo,  the  Brazilian 
reception  of  these  authors’  conception  of  political  culture  has  been  very 
positive, although Rawls’s contractarianism has been perceived as inadequate 
for a society so far from being well ordered, whose concrete mechanisms of 
exclusion seem to prohibit any idealized view of social contract. Even though 
Rawls’s  liberalism  is  explicitly  qualified  as  “political,”  in  contrast  with 
economic neoliberalism, its has fallen prey to the charges of historicism (i.e. 
that the historical conditions allowing for the emergence of a democratic, 
public political culture are hard to be conceived in a nonliberal society unless 
one resorts to an idealized, suprahistorical model). Because of its original 
affiliation  with  the  Frankfurt  School  and  the  critique  of  ideology,  the 
Habermasian model of a critical theory of society seems thus more fruitful for 
the analysis of Brazilian democratization. Since Habermas views modernity as 
a complex, rational integration of moral, political, and aesthetic culture against 
the  background  of  differentiated,  public  spheres  of  action  (state,  market, 
culture), his conception of societal modernization seems to allow for a better 
understanding of democratization and the emergence of Brazilian civil society. 
As Avritzer remarks,  
Processes  of  modernization  encompass  deep  transformations  in  the  forms  of 
organization at the everyday life level due to the introduction of impersonal forms 
of coordination of social action. These transformations have one main impact on 
society: they change century-old social practices and lead to the loss of control over 
one’s  everyday  life.  Forms  of  limitation  on  the  impersonal  coordination  of 
economic action became the solution found within modernity to offset the loss of 
freedom at this level. Authoritarianism in Brazil was part of a project of systemic 
modernization which introduced impersonal forms of action coordination without 
allowing  for  the  emergence  of  forms  of  citizenship  which  could  offset  this 
interference with traditional forms of everyday life organization. (1996, p. 245) 
It is, to my mind, at this very intersection of human social nature and 
citizenship  that  the  conception  of  a  public  political  culture  should  be 
formulated. Of course, the concept of political culture is very complex and has 
been the object of more than sixty-five definitions. According to Stephen 
Chilton (1991), nine criteria for the conceptualization of political culture arise 
from  comparitive  studies  in  political  behavior,  culture,  and  sociology: 
supramembership,  sharedness,  behavioral,  postbehavioral,  unrestricted 
applicability,  nonreductionism,  comparability,  objective  testability.  I  am 
adopting here a succint definition, proposed by Charles Taylor (1985, p. 52), 
according  to  whom  political  culture  is  “the  intersubjective  and  common 
meaning embedded in political actors’ practices.” Any radical critique of power 
would go even further and link authoritarian modernization to normalizing 
techniques that might help us account for the persistence of subjugating forms 
of social control, not only from above and centralized power, but everywhere N. de Oliveira – Globalization and democratization in Brazil:... 
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and at all levels of social networks. Ironically enough, Avritzer concludes, in 
the same text, “thus power and knowledge were utilized throughout a process in 
which state and market actors attempted to create a modern society without 
acknowledging social actors’ identity as members of economic, civil, and 
political society.” (1996, p. 248) Habermas and Rawls ultimately agree on the 
self-determination  of  the  modern  philosopher  who  can  no  longer  remain 
indifferent to the political, historical events of her own times. 
In order to articulate a reconstruction of “a differentiated, pluralist, and 
modern civil society” with “a political culture mature enough to accept the 
promise and risks of liberal and democratic citizenship,” Cohen and Arato 
carefully investigate liberal, communitarian, and radical concepts of democratic 
state and society. In particular, they explicitly embrace Habermas’s critical 
theory,  as  an  alternative  view  to  Rawls’s  political  liberalism,  so  as  to 
“accommodate the negative phenomena associated with modern civil society” 
in alternative postmodernist criticisms. Habermas’s conception of deliberative, 
participatory democracy is thus endorsed as a more adequate model than the 
ones  proposed  by  both  liberals  and  communitarians  to  be  linked  to  the 
normative grounds of a theory of civil society that accounts for both civil 
disobedience and social movements. However, as pointed out by feminist 
critics such as Seyla Benhabib (1992) and Nancy Fraser (1998), Habermas 
tends  to  undermine  the  intersubjective  basis  of  his  own theory either by 
confining its publicity to a historically, socially determined identity (European 
male) or by mimicking the other of a supposedly communicative reason in the 
functionalist colonization of marginal lifeworlds. Together with the question of 
normativity, the problem of the self was the punctum dolens of the Rawls-
Habermas debate and remains far from a satisfactory thematization, especially 
from the standpoint of those who are underrepresented in such debates. Hence 
the appeal of a radical critique of liberal reason to so-called “peripheral” 
societies, as the Neo-Marxist, economic metaphor of the 1970s still serves to 
characterize the political, cultural “dependency” of Latin America vis à vis 
global neoliberalism. In effect, it is in the post-ideological vacuum in the 
aftermath of the Cold War that liberals, communitarians, and radicals have 
attempted to rethink and redefine the role and limits of the state and civil 
society  in  Brazil,  with  a  view  to  avoiding  extremes  in  either  direction. 
(Krischke, 2001) 
To my mind, the critical appropriation of liberal and communitarian models 
in Brazil must take into account not only the empirical specificities of the 
democratizing processs, but also the theoretical limitations of most attempts at 
making sense of normativity within the social sciences. This can be particularly 
perceived in the judiciary and legislative debates, as well as in the tremendous 
challenges posed by sustainable development both to public policies and to the Civitas – Revista de Ciências Sociais v. 4, nº 1, jan.-jun. 2004 
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regulation of small, socially responsible enterprises. Hans-Georg Flickinger 
(1986)  has  convincingly  pointed  to  the  contradictions  and  shortcomings 
inherent  to  the  juridification  of  liberal  democracy,  of  which  Brazilian 
democratization is no exception. Flickinger is particularly critical of the subtle, 
oft-neglected tendency of democratic, political liberalism to evolve into a “total 
institution,” increasing the social exclusion and making almost impossible to 
believe in the effective success of social movements and grassroots claims, as 
witness both the landless movements and the very starving, miserable victims 
of famine in Northeastern Brazil (targeted by Lula’s ongoing Projeto Fome 
Zero). Hence the apparent advantage of communitarian models over its liberal 
counterparts, insofar as the public, social welfare is concerned. (Flickinger, 
2003) 
Although  social  movements,  such  as  community-based  (CEBs)  and 
liberationist grassroots movements in the seventies and the landless (sem-terra) 
movement of the nineties, together with multi-party opposition and NGOs, 
were decisive in bringing about radical transformations for democratization, 
Brazilian society paradoxically remained until recently subordinate to the state, 
even in their subtle reproduction of an authoritarian culture. Hence clientelism, 
paternalism,  corporativism,  populism,  demagogy  and  various  forms  of 
corruption seem to betray a hegemonic political culture that survived and 
permeated the military discourse on “modernization” and “development,” its 
“liberationist”  antagonists,  and  its  “liberalizing”  successors.  The1988 
constitution (Brazil’s fifth), the bureaucratic-administrative reforms and the 
land reform under way, attest to this participatory democratic process which 
has also called into question the agenda of political parties and politicians in 
their interventions between civil society and state. Witness as well the political, 
social  changes  brought  about  by  the  Workers’  Party  (PT)  on  the  local 
experience of “participatory budget” (orçamento participativo) in several parts 
of the country, but especially through the mayoral administration of the city of 
Porto Alegre for four consecutive terms and the current federal government’s 
efforts to carry out state administrative reforms. 
To  be  sure,  neither  the  more  radical  socialists  nor  moderate  social-
democrats were imune to the vices of authoritarianism, and the public opinion 
has proved rather skeptical about the programmatic, social solutions offered by 
different parties traditionally associated with the left, on the three levels of 
municipal, state, and federal offices. And yet, criticism and skepticism point 
also to some maturity in terms of political behavior. For an entire conception of 
political development is at stake in these analyses that seek to evaluate how the 
mass media, public opinion, and voters themselves concur to repudiate or 
embrace certain values linked to political events. The fundamental concept of 
public autonomy, so cherished by both Rawls and Habermas, has become one N. de Oliveira – Globalization and democratization in Brazil:... 
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of the touchstones of Brazilian political philosophy in the nineties and has been 
brought to the fore through some of the most basic democratic notions such as 
citizenship and deliberative participation. It is particularly important to recall 
that, prior to the globalization awareness of the late nineties, a moralizing turn 
was taking place in Brazilian politics as early as 1992, under the motto “ethics 
in  politics”  culminating  in  the  impeachment  of  an  elected  President. 
(Rosenfield, 1992) It would be as naive to assume that those local political 
events did not reflect global economic trends as the other way round. Above 
all, and beyond all the empirical contingencies entailed by such analyses, a 
representative democratic behavior means that democracy cannot ever be taken 
for granted, and must be thus regarded as a dynamic process in which the 
inclusive, pluralist claims of civil society condition and are conditioned by 
complex  forms  of  active,  political  participation.  The  democratization  of 
societies such as the Brazilian one coincides thus with the globalization of 
economic systems and the changes within political structures that have been 
gradually restoring (or establishing) the rule of law through constitutional 
procedures  as  well  as  the  call  for  a  sustainable  development  and  social 
responsibility.
5 Hence the resort to the Kantian idea of perpetual peace, recast 
by  both  Rawls  and  Habermas,  in  an  attempt  to  articulate  state  law  and 
international law in a globalized scenario. According to Kant, the abolition of 
war is the ultimate goal of the system of law, within a cosmopolitan perspective 
that brings about the constitutional stability of nations that subscribe to the 
liberal principles of republican democracy. Just as state law and international 
law bring about the rule of law (Rechtsstaat) within one particular nation and 
among several nations, cosmopolitan law brings the state of nature to an end by 
the institution of a universal federation of nations (Völkerbund). (Rawls, 2001) 
Both Rawls and Habermas have addressed the challenge of global justice for 
emergent societies that still face the Kantian predicament of an unsociable 
sociability without the taken-for-granted human rights that characterize welfare 
states and egalitarian, liberal democracies. The inhuman face of capitalism is 
now, more than ever, unmasked in the exploitation and social exclusion of 
women and children in many societies that provide cheap labor and raw 
material  for  industrialized  countries.  In  this  sense,  the  challenge  of 
multiculturalism  in  Brazil  provides  us  with  theoretical  perspectives  on 
ethnicities and social policies so as to account for the paradigm of a multiracial 
society that responsibly deals with racial and social inequalities to be overcome 
in the very process of democratization, even as democracy becomes the true 
currency of globalization. Miscegenation, which turns out to be a distinctive 
feature of Brazilian multiracial identity, is thus explored as a subversion of the 
very  myth  of  “racial  democracy”,  as  accommodation  gives  way  to 
____________ 
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transformation  in  inter-racial  relations.  Comparative  studies  of  US  and 
Brazilian slavery systems and racial ideologies have shown that although 
segregation and miscegenation led to radically opposing outcomes (grosso 
modo,  the  civil  conquests  of  black  movements  in  the  US  and  the  tacit 
acceptance of “whitening” as a vehicle of social mobility for Afro-Brazilians), 
the  Brazilian  experience  of democracy ultimately demands an egalitarian 
extension of freedom to all peoples of color that will or already constitute the 
majority population. (Andrews, 1991) Afro-American transnational identity in 
Latin American and Caribbean social groups turns out to be one of the greatest 
examples of cultural resiliency in the world, but the same concept may as well 
be extended to other ethnicities across Brazil, such as Latinos, Jews, Arabs, and 
numerous native American peoples. 
In conclusion, what is at stake is a political-theoretical problem, namely, the 
attempt to account for both democratization and its undermining contradictions 
in the process of the rationalization of complex forms of social life, as well as 
to account for the fact that we did not have either a political-liberal nor a 
nationwide revolutionary experience in Brazil. Moreover, anyone who sets out 
to think “civil society”, “democracy” and “modernity” in Brazil has to face the 
challenge of avoiding, on the one hand, the facile importation of European and 
North-American categories uncritically applied to a Brazilian context, and the 
aporetic, self-deceptive attempt to create ex nihilo, in the pseudo-originality of 
reinventing the wheel. For the better or for the worse, we must always start in 
medias  res,  from  what  we  are:  a  racist, sexist, and elitist society with a 
tremendous potential for self-overcoming and social transformation. Hence 
both bureaucratic-administrative reforms and judicial reforms under way attest 
to this participatory democratic process which has also called into question the 
agenda of political parties and politicians in their interventions between civil 
society and state. In effect, the very role of opposition in post-military Brazil 
has been one of the targets of serious social criticism. As Roberto Mangabeira 
Unger (1995, p. 240f) put it so well:  
There are two ways that a transformative politics can be disparaged. One is to give 
in entirely to the maxim that politics is the art of the possible. If you always respect 
the limits of the possible and cultivate the image of the realist, you end up a 
prisoner to the established system of interests and prejudices. This way is to submit, 
as the majority of socialist and workers’ parties in the rich Western democracies 
have done. They have tried to humanize the existing order rather than to remake it. 
On  the  other  hand,  whoever  loses  touch  with  unyielding  realities  becomes 
disoriented in the vacuum of loose utopias. This was the fate of sectarian and 
revolutionary leftists throughout the course of the twentieth century. We have had 
too few examples in the twentieth century of a left that, treading the narrow path 
between these opposing dangers, has insisted upon testing the limits of the possible. 
The PT [Brazilian Workers’ Party] has been one of these examples.  N. de Oliveira – Globalization and democratization in Brazil:... 
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Without  any  pretensions  to  having  solved  or  even  addressed  all  the 
problems raised by these debates between Habermasians and Rawlsians, or 
lying at the transition from authoritarian Brazil to a democratic society, I have 
outlined some thoughts on global justice and normativity which relate to a 
broader problematic, namely, that of redefining the role and identity of civil 
society in the unfinished project of “democratizing Brazil.” It is important thus 
to  stress  that  the  question  of  “who  we  Brazilians  are”  –the  question  of 
collective, national subjectivity thematized by Rawls and Habermas-- cannot 
avoid the tension between what we have been, what we shall become, and what 
we ought to be. For the question of collective self-identity lies at the heart of a 
self-understanding of aesthetic, moral, and political culture --even beyond the 
traditional conceptions of the nation-state. If we want to find the grounds for 
the “self-reassurance” necessary to carry out a project of emancipation --in 
Brazil as elsewhere-- the wholistic approach to reason and action must integrate 
everyday social life, and this requires some commitment on the part of civil 
society to reaching understanding about validity claims. This is perhaps the 
secret utopia of the Habermasian fusion of the horizons of solidarity and 
autonomy, between facts and norms, and undoubtedly the secret to his success 
among social-democrats and the advocates of the Third Way in Brazil. If Rawls 
fails  to  provide  us  with  a  substantiated  account  of  the  intersubjectively 
constituted liberal culture that carries out the democratic ideals of his theory of 
justice, Habermas reconceives “public autonomy” as “the availability of a 
differentiated  network  of  communicative  arrangements  for  the  discursive 
formation of public opinion and will,” as a system of basic individual rights 
“provides exactly the conditions under which the forms of communication 
necessary  for  a  politically  autonomous  constitution  of  law  can  be 
institutionalized.” (1992, p. 134-5, 207-9) Brazilian citizens have certainly 
been socialized into a rather corrupt political culture, so full of contradictions 
and shortcomings when compared to the normative, regulative ideals of the 
democratic  yardstick.  And  yet,  this  making  of  a  political  culture  is  only 
sustained to the extent that Brazilians also produce and reproduce such a 
culture. The shift from a hypocritical “racial democracy” towards a societal, 
pluralist democracy is the only way out of the “elitist liberalism” of both 
military  and  civilian  calls  to  modernize  Brazil.  Just  as  the  aestheticist 
regionalism and nationalism of the modernist movement of the 1920s gave way 
to a technocratic, nationalist modernization in the 1950s and 1960s only to 
highlight the oligarchic, hierarchical relations of power that made Brazil one of 
the most socially unequal nations of the planet, a moral revolution from below 
alone can secure the rule of law for all and call for a public, democratic 
distribution of primary goods. If Brazil remains too far from a well ordered 
society and public participation in the bargain processes is still remote from the 
majority of the population, the political thrust of social movements and civil Civitas – Revista de Ciências Sociais v. 4, nº 1, jan.-jun. 2004 
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disobedience meets a fortiori the normative criteria of a concept of democracy 
that defies and transgresses any “power that be” for the sake of the people. That 
the outcast in Brazil discover their own identity as citizens, rights-bearers or as 
end-in-themselves only attests to the proximity between Rousseau and Kant in 
both radical and liberal formulations of the volonté générale and the kingdom 
of ends, between Habermas and Rawls. Hence a radical critique of state and 
society is not necessarily opposed to the regulative ideals of a procedural 
theory of justice. Whether politics is simply a continuation of the war of all 
against all or a consensus-seeking overcoming of the state of nature, what is at 
stake is precisely what is lacking (justice) and yet we seek by all reasonable 
means to make it possible. In order to carry on our reflections on the limits of 
the possible, Brazilian civil society must thus continually renew every critique 
of its own identity, past and present, so as to allow for both freedom and justice 
to flourish and radically transform itself. 
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